Ali Akbar Ahmadi Aframjani; Soheila Mansourian
Abstract
Herbert Marcuse, a Frankfurt philosopher, has tried to redefine the concept of reason from Hegel's point of view. In his different view, he tries to show that the category of cognition and self-consciousness is not possible without addressing the hidden parts of the reason by adding psychoanalysis. He ...
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Herbert Marcuse, a Frankfurt philosopher, has tried to redefine the concept of reason from Hegel's point of view. In his different view, he tries to show that the category of cognition and self-consciousness is not possible without addressing the hidden parts of the reason by adding psychoanalysis. He argues that it is an important part of recognizing desire and has been suppressed by the system of dictatorship in history. For Marcuse, the field of aesthetics and art are the parts in which the psyche is manifested, through which one can recognize the neglected parts and the position of individual desire and approach freedom. A case study of Kamal al-Molk of Iranian culture is a very good example, given all the angles that Marcuse describes. An artist who does not change when he sees change and, on the contrary, resists it and does not happen to achieve the self-consciousness that Marcuse wants. This poses a new complexity to Marcuse's position. This article tries to explore the inadequacy of each of the philosophical and psychoanalytic views according to the given example to say that the desire of the subject involved in the individual subconscious is confiscated long before puberty in childhood. He is barren and incapable of any movement. In this new narrative, it becomes clear that the concept of reason has a recovery beyond the mere realization of Marcuse's intended aesthetics, and that its implications are more serious and profound than what Hegel, Marcuse, and Freud thought.
Ali Akbar Ahmadi Afarmejani; Abdollah Salarvand
Abstract
In the first Critique, Kant delineated the principles of metaphysics of nature and in the second Critique, those of metaphysics of morality. Since these two kinds of principles were essentially distinguished, there appeared an absolute gap between nature and morality, which Kant called abyss or gulf ...
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In the first Critique, Kant delineated the principles of metaphysics of nature and in the second Critique, those of metaphysics of morality. Since these two kinds of principles were essentially distinguished, there appeared an absolute gap between nature and morality, which Kant called abyss or gulf and emphasized that it is "incalculable". That is, if one considers only the first and the second Critique, one should accept the dualism in the essence of subject. Kant, however, takes over in the third Critique the task of investigating the possibility of transition between the two sections of the dualism.
In this paper, we try first to clarify what it means that a transition occurs between nature and morality and then to show how it occurs. Before that, however, we should transform the metaphorical expression of "gulf" into a logical one in order to get the problem right. Once this is done, the meaning of transition becomes clear. In order to delineate how the transition is realized, we should appeal to concepts of the beautiful and the sublime. The transition in the sphere of the beautiful occurs in three instances: intellectual interest in beautiful, the genius, and being the symbol of morality. But in the sphere of the sublime which is "formless", one should go beyond the purposiveness of the form of nature. It will be clear that the sublime represents the possibility of transition in two respects: by introducing the idea of humanity and morality and by aesthetic representation of reason "as both theoretical and practical" which is nothing but unity of the first and the second part of Kantian philosophy.
Mahdi Mohammadi asl; Ali Akbar Ahmadi Aframjani
Abstract
Hegel reads Kant's three critiques, that of the Critique of Pure reason, Practical Reason, and Judgment with a critical approach. The critique called "empty formalism", in different forms, is present in Hegel's works, from youth till death, thus sometimes is hidden in others critiques and sometimes is ...
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Hegel reads Kant's three critiques, that of the Critique of Pure reason, Practical Reason, and Judgment with a critical approach. The critique called "empty formalism", in different forms, is present in Hegel's works, from youth till death, thus sometimes is hidden in others critiques and sometimes is so obvious that hides other critiques within itself. But finally, the base of it is founded upon the idea that Kant's morality is a non-historical, formal and empty one, thus, in concrete situations of action, it cannot assist moral agents and does not tell him/her how to act. For Hegel, the main reason of this inability stems from Kant's strict and arid morality, which by transcending practical reason and detaching its relation with wants and particular and subjective inclinations, makes it empty and reduces it to a universal form of law.
Ahmad Sharafshahi; Ali Akbar Ahmadi Aframjani
Abstract
Wittgenstein in his later Philosophy, as in his early Philosophy, reiterates that philosophical method or activity is a critical activity although he develops it method in his later Philosophy. In some fragments of Philosophical Investigations, he calls this method therapeutic, in which, the philosopher ...
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Wittgenstein in his later Philosophy, as in his early Philosophy, reiterates that philosophical method or activity is a critical activity although he develops it method in his later Philosophy. In some fragments of Philosophical Investigations, he calls this method therapeutic, in which, the philosopher recognizes the cause of fallacy or categorical mistake. Establishing such a method has been possible through a new vision of language, which does not see language as apart from linguistic activities. In other words, concepts have internal relation with our linguistic activities and our life-with-concepts, and their meanings are not graspable separate from their context. Indeed, by concentration on "use" in language, Wittgenstein wants to show the interrelation of language and our form of life. In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophical problems arise of neglecting this insight about language because philosophers see language separate and abstracted from any activity. By considering Wittgenstein’s revolutionary approach to language, philosophical problems arise from ignoring and confusing the uses of language, which will be dissolved with showing the confusion.
Morteza Vaez ghassemi; Ali Akbar Ahmadi Aframjani
Abstract
There are at leastthree different approaches to self-referential in the tradition of analytic philosophy including Russellian approach, positivistian, approachand Wittgensteinian approach. Each of these approaches have suggested distinct solution for the self-referential problem. Among themthe Wittgensteinian ...
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There are at leastthree different approaches to self-referential in the tradition of analytic philosophy including Russellian approach, positivistian, approachand Wittgensteinian approach. Each of these approaches have suggested distinct solution for the self-referential problem. Among themthe Wittgensteinian one has caused much debate. The penultimate Phrase of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (6.54) says that all terms are meaningless, Including himself.This self-referential puts the audience of Tractatus in the paradoxical situation.This self-referential puts the audience of Tractatus in the paradoxical situation.Wittgenstein, by invent ion of the concept of ladder wants to escape from t he self-referential. Of the two interpretations, Resolute Reading and Ineffability Reading have addressed this topic. They try to give text bay consistent readivg of the interpreting the word "nonsense". But these two interpretations to each other through the criticism seems to be basically self-referential approach to resolve the crisis Wittgensteinian not help.But leveling criticism by these two interpretations to each other shows that basically self-referential approach is incapabel to resolve this crisis.
Ali Akbar Ahmadi Aframjani; Ahmad Rahmanian
Abstract
This paper examines Nelson Goodman’s position on the ontological problem of value of art, in other words, the question of ‘what kind is the relation between valuable feature(s) of artworks to them, in Goodman’s aesthetic cognitivism. In the first place, by examining several issues ...
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This paper examines Nelson Goodman’s position on the ontological problem of value of art, in other words, the question of ‘what kind is the relation between valuable feature(s) of artworks to them, in Goodman’s aesthetic cognitivism. In the first place, by examining several issues about (1) the types of the relations between valuable feature of an object to it, (2) the types of the relations between valuable feature of a work to it, and (3) Goodman’s position on the normative problem of value of art, provides the rudiments to solve the above question. In the next place, it suggests that although Goodman is a cognitivist, in the normative issue of value of art, and cognitivism is an anti-essentialism position, it is not that his anti-essentialism is entirely consistent with cognitivists’ anti-essentialism. Goodman and cognitivists are partners in the beliefs that cognitive value attributed to art is (1) plural and (2) is not unique to art. But, do not share the biliefs that (3) the value is common in all works of art and (4) the relation between the value to artworks is intrinsic. However, he does not violate anti-essentialism, although 3 and 4 makes him close to essentialism, Because Goodman’s common cognitive value is not unique to works of art.
